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As at 15 June 2015, a large transmission cluster of 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) was ongoing in South Korea. To examine the 
potential for such events, we estimated the level of 
heterogeneity in MERS-CoV transmission by analys-
ing data on cluster size distributions. We found sub-
stantial potential for superspreading; even though it 
is likely that R0 < 1 overall, our analysis indicates that 
cluster sizes of over 150 cases are not unexpected for 
MERS-CoV infection. 
MERS-CoV transmission
There have been 1,288 cases of Middle East respira-
tory syndrome (MERS) reported worldwide as at 10 
June 2015 [1]. Many of these have been index cases, 
likely to have been infected from an animal reservoir, 
but there have also been several clusters of human-
to-human transmission. An imported MERS case with 
a travel history to the Arabian Peninsula resulted in a 
new cluster in South Korea, with 150 cases reported as 
at 15 June 2015 [2]. This raises two important questions 
about the transmission dynamics of MERS coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV). First, how much heterogeneity is there 
in MERS-CoV transmission in the absence of animal–
human infection? Second, given such heterogeneity, 
what are the chances of observing an outbreak as large 
as the one in South Korea?
The dynamics of an outbreak depend on both R0 – the 
average number of secondary cases generated by a 
typical infectious individual – and individual hetero-
geneity in transmission. Such heterogeneity can be 
estimated by describing the distribution of secondary 
cases as a negative binomial distribution with dis-
persion parameter k, where k < 1 suggests that trans-
mission is overdispersed, and hence outbreaks can 
include superspreading events [3,4]. However, there 
is currently no measure of transmission heterogeneity 
for MERS-CoV. Using reported outbreak data, we exam-
ined the extent of individual variation in MERS-CoV 
transmission, and estimated the probability of observ-
ing clusters as large as the one in South Korea.
Analysing cluster data
We analysed data on MERS cluster sizes for cases 
reported up to 31 August 2013 [5]. For comparison, we 
also considered data from two other reports, up to 21 
June 2013 [6] and 8 August 2013 [7]. Cases with known 
epidemiological links were classified as a cluster. 
Single index cases were considered as independent 
clusters of size one. Although more cases have since 
been reported [1], it is not entirely clear how many clus-
ters there have been. We therefore chose to focus on 
published cluster data (Table), which also made it pos-
sible to compare our results with previous analyses.
To estimate R0 and k from the distribution of cluster 
sizes, we used a likelihood-based inference method 
based on branching processes with the offspring distri-
bution following a negative binomial distribution with 
mean R0 and dispersion parameter k. This distribution 
is widely used to describe overdispersed count data in 
biology and epidemiology [4], and has the useful prop-
erty that Poisson (k = ∞) and geometric offspring dis-
tributions (k = 1) are special cases of it. The probability 
that an index case generates a cluster of size j is [8,9]: 
Therefore the likelihood of observing nj clusters of size 
j is:
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For given values of R0 and k, the probability that an 
index case generates a transmission cluster of size j or 
greater is:
Assuming N introductions of infections into the human 
population, the probability that at least one cluster of 
size j or greater occurs is 1 – (1 – pj)
N. All analyses were 
done in the R software environment for statistical com-
puting [10].
Findings*
Using available cluster data, we jointly estimated R0 
and the dispersion parameter k for MERS-CoV (Figure 1). 
Analysis of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
coronavirus transmission during the early stages of the 
outbreak in Singapore suggested k = 0.16 (90% confi-
dence interval (CI): 0.11–0.64) [3] (the study cited 90% 
CI owing to the paucity of available data). Our estimate 
for MERS-CoV is similar, with k = 0.26 (90% CI: 0.11–
0.87, 95% CI: 0.09–1.24). As it is not always clear from 
case reports which cases are epidemiologically linked, 
we also estimated k using data from two other stud-
ies of clusters [6,7]. These data included fewer clusters 
and were less conclusive regarding the amount of over-
dispersion, with k = 0.61 (95% CI: 0.16–∞) [7] and k = 
2.94 (95% CI: 0.23–∞) [6].
Our estimate for R0 was 0.47 (95% CI: 0.29–0.80). 
The maximum likelihood estimate (0.47),  which is 
independent of k [8], agrees with previous work [5-7]. 
However unlike earlier studies, which assumed the 
distribution of secondary cases to be either geometric 
(i.e. k = 1) [5,7] or Poisson (k = ∞) [6], our upper 95% 
CI is larger. This is because allowing for potential over-
dispersion increases the uncertainty surrounding the 
estimate of R0 (Figure 1).
There is an intricate relationship between the basic 
reproduction number, R0, the dispersion parameter, k, 
and the probability of observing a large transmission 
cluster (Figure 2A). For a given value of k, increasing R0 
also increases the probability of observing large clus-
ters. If R0 is low, a higher variation in the number of sec-
ondary cases (i.e. smaller k) increases the probability 
of observing large transmission clusters owing to the 
potential for superspreading. The effect of k is reversed 
for values of R0 near one, where a smaller k reduces the 
probability of observing large clusters. This is because 
a higher variation in the number of secondary cases 
increases the probability that an infected index case 
does not generate further cases [3]. Interestingly, the 
Figure 1 
Joint estimates of basic reproduction number, R0, and dispersion parameter, k, for MERS-CoV*
MERS-CoV: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; SARS: 
severe acute respiratory syndrome.
Estimates are based on reported cluster size distributions 
until 31 August 2013 (orange), 8 August 2013 (blue) and 21 June 
2013 (green) reported by Poletto et al. [5], Cauchemez et al. [7] 
and Breban et al. [6], respectively. Points indicate maximum 
likelihood estimates and lines show 90% (dashed) and 95% (solid) 
confidence intervals. The red dashed line indicates the dispersion 
parameter k = 0.16 that was reported for SARS coronavirus [3].
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Table 
Data sources used for MERS clustersa of a given size 
(including index case), based on laboratory-confirmed 
MERS case reports worldwideb*
Cluster size
Number of MERS clusters of a given size
Breban et al. 
[6]c
Cauchemez 
et al. [7]
Poletto et al. 
[5]c
1 11 27 42
2 2 2 7
3 3 4 2
4 1 3 –
5 2 2 2
7 – 1 – 
10 – – 1
13 – 1 –
22 – – 1
24 1 – –
26 – 1 – 
MERS: Middle East respiratory syndrome.
Dashes indicate that there were no such reports.
a  Cases with known epidemiological links were classified as a 
cluster. Single index cases were considered as independent 
clusters of size one.
b We analysed data on MERS cluster sizes for cases reported up 
to 31 August 2013 [5]. For comparison, we also considered data 
from two other reports, up to 21 June 2013 [6] and 8 August 2013 
[7].
c  These studies listed more than one set of possible clusters, 
depending on how cases were interpreted. We therefore 
considered data from the most pessimistic scenario in each 
study, which included the probable cases in the Jordan outbreak 
in April 2012.
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area where the effect of overdispersion for a given 
value of R0 switches from increasing to decreasing the 
probability to observe large cluster sizes lies near the 
maximum likelihood estimate for MERS-CoV (Figure 
2B).
 
Finally, we calculated the expected probability of 
observing a MERS-CoV transmission cluster of a given 
size or greater, by integrating across the full parameter 
distribution in Figure 1. Using the estimated distribu-
tion of k substantially increases the probability that 
index cases generate large clusters (Figure 3A), com-
pared with the situation in which the number of second-
ary cases are assumed to be geometrically distributed 
(k = 1). The probability that a single index case infected 
with MERS-CoV results in a cluster of 150 cases or more 
– as observed in South Korea – is 0.04%. Assuming dif-
ferent numbers of MERS-CoV introductions into human 
populations, the probabilities that at least one such 
outbreak occurs are 2.5% (100 introductions), 5.6% 
(500 introductions), 7.4% (1,000 introductions) and 
9.3% (2,000 introductions). 
Discussion
Our results suggest that MERS-CoV transmission is 
highly overdispersed, and hence there is substantial 
potential for superspreading events. This finding is cor-
roborated by a similar analysis of MERS-CoV outbreak 
size distributions [11]. Given that hundreds of MERS-
CoV index cases have been reported to date, our analy-
sis indicates that occasional cluster sizes of over 150 
cases – such as the one in South Korea – should not 
be unexpected. We also found a non-linear relation-
ship between the basic reproduction number, R0, dis-
persion parameter, k, and outbreak size: when R0 < 0.9, 
the probability of obtaining a large cluster increases 
as the process becomes more overdispersed; as R0 
approaches one, the effect is reversed and a higher 
level of overdispersion reduces the chances of a large 
cluster for a given value of R0.
There are some limitations to our study. Case data may 
be subject to bias or under-reporting. However, such 
factors will generally drive up estimates of overdisper-
sion [4] and hence are unlikely to alter our overall con-
clusions. It can also be difficult to conclusively identify 
outbreak clusters from case data. We therefore consid-
ered three different data sources, and found evidence 
of overdispersion in the two largest and most recent 
data sets.
Other infections, including SARS [3] and Ebola virus 
disease [12], also exhibit overdispersed transmission 
patterns. However, it can be difficult to establish pre-
cisely which factors drive superspreading events. For 
MERS-CoV, the observed overdispersion may result 
Figure 2
Relationship between the basic reproduction number, R0, the dispersion parameter, k, and the probability that a transmission cluster reaches at least 150 cases*
MERS-CoV: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
Panel A: Probability that a single index case generates a transmission cluster of 150 cases or greater. Panel B: Relative risk of seeing a cluster 
of at least 150 cases, compared with the scenario where k = 1 (geometric distribution of secondary cases). The points indicate maximum 
likelihood estimates of R0 and k for MERS-CoV, and the dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals.
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from a combination of factors, including individual 
viral shedding and contact rates, hospital procedures 
and location, as well as population structure and den-
sity [13]. Even if such factors cannot be disentangled, 
measuring the overall extent of overdispersion – as we 
have done here – can help with the interpretation of 
surveillance data, and enable more realistic analysis of 
disease transmission and control [14].
* Authors’ correction
A typo in the code that was used for the analysis resulted 
in erroneous estimates for the dispersion parameter k and 
the confidence intervals surrounding the basic reproduction 
number R0. All numbers in the text and the figures have been 
updated using the corrected estimates of k. Furthermore, 
figures have been updated to include parameter estimates 
derived from the largest data set of cluster sizes as report-
ed by Poletto et al. [5]. The study now refers to a more re-
cent analysis of MERS-CoV outbreak size distributions that 
showed very similar results [11]. These changes were made 
on 10 August 2015, at the request of the authors.
The authors have made the code available on GitHub (htt-
ps://github.com/calthaus/MERS) to ensure reproducibility of 
the analysis.
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